



Upjohn Institute Press 
 
 
What Will the States Do 
When Jobs Are Not 
Plentiful? 







LaDonna A. Pavetti 











Chapter 8 (pp. 221-248) in: 
Economic Conditions and Welfare Reform 
Sheldon H. Danziger, ed. 




Copyright ©1999. W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. All rights reserved. 
What Will the States Do When 
Jobs Are Not Plentiful?
Policy and Implementation Challenges
LaDonna A. Pavetti 
Mathematica Policy Research, Inc.
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation 
Act (PRWORA) of 1996 ended the individual entitlement to welfare 
benefits under the 61-year-old Aid to Families with Dependent Chil 
dren (AFDC) program and eliminated the companion welfare-to-work 
program, the Job Opportunities and Basic Skills (JOBS) training pro 
gram created by the Family Support Act of 1988. PRWORA provides 
each state with a block grant to establish a Temporary Assistance for 
Needy Families (TANF) program.
In contrast to the AFDC program (which provided cash assistance 
for as long as needed) and to the JOBS program (which encouraged 
recipients to participate in long-term education and training programs), 
TANF provides short-term, work-oriented assistance to poor families 
with children. TANF recipients are required to work once they are job- 
ready or after receiving assistance for not more than 24 months (and 
less at state option), and persons are eligible to receive TANF assis 
tance for only 60 months out of their lifetime. To ensure that state 
TANF programs emphasize work, PRWORA requires states to meet 
steadily increasing work participation rates to receive their full block 
grant.
WELFARE REFORM IN A ROBUST ECONOMY
Given that PRWORA mandates a work-oriented assistance sys 
tem, the economic conditions under which states began their programs
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could not have been better. In most areas of the country, welfare 
offices shifted to a work-based system during a time when jobs were 
plentiful. When PRWORA was signed into law in August 1996, the 
unemployment rate was just 5.2 percent, down from almost 7 percent 
four years earlier. By October 1998, the unemployment rate had 
declined even further, to 4.6 percent; for women over the age of 20, the 
unemployment rate was just 4.0 percent. Although unemployment 
rates remain higher for population groups who traditionally have had a 
harder time finding employment, unemployment rates have declined 
for these groups as well. For example, persons over the age of 25 years 
of age without a high school diploma currently face an unemployment 
rate of 6.8 percent, down from 8.5 percent in August 1996, and African 
Americans face an unemployment rate of 8.6 percent, down from 10.7 
percent (Bureau of Labor Statistics 1998). There are, however, areas of 
the country that have not shared in the good fortunes of the current eco 
nomic boom; for example, former coal mining regions in Kentucky and 
Virginia are currently experiencing unemployment rates of nearly 20 
percent.
A strong, robust economy with low inflation rates and unprece 
dented policy and programmatic changes in the welfare system have 
resulted in significant declines in the number of families receiving cash 
assistance; between January 1993 and June 1998, that number declined 
by 39 percent, from 4.96 million to 3.03 million families. Sixteen 
states experienced at least a 50 percent reduction in the number of fam 
ilies receiving assistance. However, with caseload declines of 18 and 
24 percent, respectively, California and New York (the states with the 
two largest caseloads) experienced significantly smaller caseload 
declines than most other states and the nation as a whole. Hawaii, the 
only state with an increased caseload, provided cash assistance to 38 
percent more families in June 1998 than in January 1993 (Administra 
tion for Children and Families 1998).
As a result of the steep decline in AFDC/TANF caseloads, most 
states have been able to implement major work-based reforms in a 
resource-rich environment. A recent General Accounting Office study 
(U.S. General Accounting Office 1998) found that the amount of 
TANF funds available to states for 1997 was $4.7 billion more than 
states would have had under the old AFDC formula. The median 
increase for states was 22 percent, with 46 states having more money
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than they would have had under AFDC formula. Since the enactment 
of PRWORA, states also have achieved budgetary savings by reducing 
state expenditures on welfare programs to the 75 or 80 percent "main 
tenance of effort" (MOE) required by federal law. Even with the state 
budgetary savings, 21 states are spending more per recipient than they 
were prior to the implementation of TANF (U.S. General Accounting 
Office 1998).
On top of their TANF funding, over the next several years states 
and localities will have access to close to $3 billion in additional funds 
from the Welfare-to-work grants program (legislated in 1997) to 
implement work-based strategies for hard-to-employ welfare recipi 
ents. Some communities are using these funds to expand existing pro 
grams; others are using them to develop more intensive short-term 
training and/or supported work programs, or to provide existing and/or 
new services to underserved groups such as noncustodial fathers. 
Through the Child Care Development block grant, states also received 
additional funding to expand their child care programs for welfare 
recipients and/or for the working poor. Several states have used these 
additional funds to fully fund their child care program for welfare 
recipients and to eliminate or significantly reduce the waiting list for 
child care for working poor families.
Implementing work-oriented reforms in a resource-rich and job- 
rich environment has meant that states have been able to require the 
majority of TANF applicants or recipients to participate in work or 
work-related activities without developing long waiting lists, as was 
often the case under the JOBS program. Given the low unemployment 
rate, they have tended to rely on low-cost job search strategies while 
providing support services, especially child care and transportation 
assistance, to families who cannot afford to pay for these services on 
their own.
Now that caseloads have declined, many states have started to 
expand their welfare-to-work programs to help recipients retain jobs 
and advance to better jobs, instead of just focusing on getting recipi 
ents into jobs as they have in the past. For example, Rhode Island has 
implemented a statewide job retention unit to provide assistance to 
recipients who have been placed in employment and to employers who 
have hired recipients. Utah is providing training and paying for addi 
tional supervision for some welfare recipients who are placed in
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unsubsidized employment. Because many families remaining on the 
TANF rolls are harder-to-employ, some states have started to experi 
ment with ways to help families facing a broad array of personal and 
family challenges make the transition from welfare to work. Oregon, 
North Carolina, Maryland, and New Jersey have implemented pro 
grams to identify and refer recipients to substance abuse treatment pro 
grams. Washington, Kansas, and Minnesota are implementing 
programs to identify and provide services to recipients with learning 
disabilities. Because they have multiple barriers to employment, many 
of the families left on the welfare rolls are likely to require more 
resources to make the transition to employment than those who have 
already left the rolls. For now, the extra resources that states and local 
ities have at their disposal have created an environment that is welcom 
ing of new ideas and supports investment in promising (but not yet 
proven) strategies to help welfare recipients with limited attachment to 
the labor force become self-sufficient.
IMPLEMENTING WORK-BASED REFORMS WHEN JOBS 
ARE MORE SCARCE
When the economy changes and firms are laying off more workers 
than they are hiring, federal, state, and local decision makers and pro 
gram operators will face a different set of policy and programmatic 
choices than they face in the current environment. Given PRWORA 
mandates and that widespread support exists for a work-based assis 
tance system, it is unlikely that a downturn in the economy will result 
in a shift away from the current emphasis on employment. Thus, the 
major challenge decision makers will face is identifying options for 
maintaining a focus on work in an environment where unsubsidized 
employment is more difficult to find, where welfare entrances will 
increase and exits will decrease, and where financial resources no 
longer expand to meet the increased demand for assistance.
PRWORA gave states unprecedented authority to decide how they 
would use their fixed TANF funds to meet the income, employment, 
and support service needs of poor families with children. PRWORA 
does, however, provide broad programmatic guidelines that have
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shaped the design of many state TANF programs and will affect states' 
ability to respond to an economic downturn. For example, PRWORA 
defines the activities that can count towards a state's work participation 
rate and specifies the number of hours a recipient must participate in 
allowable activities. PRWORA also set a lifetime limit on assistance 
and the fraction of a state's caseload that can be exempt from the time 
limit. As a result of the requirements PRWORA places on states, Con 
gress and the federal government will have a major role to play in 
developing an appropriate response to an economic downturn, or states 
will face programmatic and financial difficulties.
Within PRWORA's framework, states and localities have imple 
mented a variety of strategies to transform their cash assistance sys 
tems into systems that mandate and support work. Table 1 provides 
examples of the types of policies states have implemented. At the core 
of nearly all of these reform efforts are job search assistance and job 
placement programs, generally referred to as "Work First" programs. 
These programs range from independent job search programs (such as 
those implemented in Virginia, where recipients mostly are required to 
look for employment on their own and report regularly on their 
progress) to more structured group job search programs such as those 
implemented in Oregon and Nebraska (where recipients participate in 
structured job search activities such as how to complete an application, 
write a resume, and conduct themselves in a job interview). Even if 
different in their day-to-day operation, these programs share a common 
philosophy regarding world: any job is viewed as a good job, and pro 
gram efforts are geared towards helping recipients enter the labor mar 
ket as quickly as possible (Brown 1997; Holcomb et al. 1998).
In many states, the work expectations set forth through these pro 
grams have been reinforced with more stringent financial penalties for 
noncompliance (sanctions), more generous earned-income disregards 
that allow more recipients to continue to receive cash assistance while 
they are working, and time limits to create a new social contract that 
presents assistance recipients with a very different set of expectations 
and choices than they have faced in the past. While some states like 
California and Washington have relied primarily on incentives to 
encourage parents to enter the paid labor market, other states such as 
Wisconsin have relied more on penalties for not complying with work 
mandates. A number of states, like Massachusetts and Florida, have
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Initial benefit reduction 
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60 months, followed by 
termination of benefits
60 months, followed by 
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60 months, followed by 
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48 months, followed by 
termination of benefits2
Earnings disregard policy
100% of earnings in first 3 
months, then 20%
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Vanes by county
$200 and 50 percent of 
remainder
Massachusetts Work or community 
service required within 
60 days for families with a 
child over the age of 6; no 
job search or work require 
ment for other families
Initial benefit reduction 
followed by loss of all cash 
assistance
24 months out of 60, 
followed by termination 
of benefits




Michigan Immediate job search Initial benefit reduction, 
followed by loss of all cash 
assistance
None $200 and 20% of remainder
Minnesota Job search for 8 weeks, 
followed by assessment 




Initial benefit reduction, 
followed by loss of all cash 
assistance
60 months, followed by 
termination of benefits
36%
Mississippi Immediate job search Immediate loss of all cash 
assistance
60 months, followed by 
termination of benefits
100% for first 6 months if 
full-time employment is 
obtained within 30 days after 
job search is required; 
otherwise $90
New Jersey Immediate job search,
followed by various work 
readiness activities
Initial benefit reduction, 
followed by loss of all cash 
assistance
60 months, followed by 
termination of benefits
100% for first month, then 50 
percent
New York Determined by counties; 
immediate job search and 
community work 
experience are common
Benefit reduction 60 months, followed by 
reduction in benefits3
$90 and 42% of remainder
Texas Job search immediately Benefit reduction 60 months, followed by 
termination of benefits
$120 and 1/3 of remainder for 
four months; $120 for eight 
months; then $90
Washington Job search or other work 
activities after assessment 
and development of an 
Individual Responsibility 
Plan












Benefit reduction or loss 
of all cash assistance4
Most stringent 
time limit




Source: Gallagher et al. 1998.
1 Information is presented for the 13 states that are a part of the Urban Institute's "Assessing the New Federalism" project, a multi-year 
project designed to examine state choices and outcomes associated with the implementation of PRWORA.
2 In addition to the 48-month lifetime limit, Florida also has a 24-out-of-48-month time limit for job-ready recipients and a time limit of 
36 out of 72 months for long-term recipients with poor job skills and little work experience.
3 In addition to benefits being reduced, payments are provided in the form of vendor payments to cover the family's major expenses such 
as rent or utilities.
4 Wisconsin uses a "pay for performance" system of determining benefits. If a recipient works some, but not all of the required hours, 
their grant is reduced by the minimum wage for every hour not worked. If a recipient does not work any of the required hours, they do 
not receive any of their cash assistance.
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combined incentives and penalties. With a few exceptions, most states 
have imposed lifetime limits on the number of months families can 
receive TANF assistance. These limits have created a sense of urgency 
not found in previous welfare-to-work programs.
When the economy weakens, decision makers and program opera 
tors are likely to face five key challenges: 1) reallocating program 
expenditures to account for larger assistance caseloads; 2) reassessing 
what constitutes work participation and for whom participation is 
required; 3) identifying strategies for continuing to provide work 
incentives and work supports when resources are limited; 4) reassess 
ing time limits to take into account the more limited availability of 
jobs; and 5) maintaining a focus on strategies to help the hardest-to- 
employ find jobs and to help recipients keep their jobs longer and move 
into better jobs. Politics, fiscal realities, programmatic goals, and 
administrative capacity all are likely to influence the way in which 
states and localities resolve these challenges.
Reallocating Program Expenditures to Account for Larger 
Assistance Caseloads
States have had additional resources to spend on welfare-to-work 
activities and supportive services for welfare recipients because they 
are spending less money providing cash assistance to families. When 
jobs are not as readily available as they are now, caseloads are likely to 
begin to increase. It is possible that cash assistance caseloads will not 
increase to their previously high levels. Nonetheless, because welfare- 
to-work program activities and support services are now essential com 
ponents of state TANF programs, for the first time states will be forced 
to weigh the tradeoffs between allocating resources to cash grants and 
other services that help parents to find and maintain work.
Although states and localities now have the authority to deny cash 
assistance to families seeking assistance if expenditures for cash bene 
fits begin to exceed budget allocations, there are no indications that 
states will pursue this course of action. Even though PRWORA ended 
the entitlement to cash assistance, states have continued to treat the 
receipt of TANF benefits as an entitlement; that is, all families who 
apply for assistance and meet the eligibility criteria (including any 
work requirements) receive cash assistance.
230 Pavetti
Some states, however, have tightened the eligibility requirements, 
resulting in a smaller pool of eligible families. For example, Idaho's 
caseload declined by 77 percent between January 1997 and June 1998, 
primarily because the state began to count income from the Supple 
mental Security Income (SSI) program when determining eligibility 
for TANF cash assistance. Most states that have tightened eligibility 
requirements have done so by imposing work-related requirements on 
families when they apply for assistance. For example, 16 states require 
parents to look for work before their application for assistance is 
approved (Maloy et al. 1998). If caseloads begin to increase rapidly 
during a recession, other states may begin to include additional sources 
of income when determining eligibility. However, states may be less 
inclined to impose work requirements as a condition of eligibility since 
fewer applicants are likely to find jobs and more families are likely to 
turn to the welfare system because they have just lost a job.
Because TANF funding is fixed, if states continue to maintain the 
entitlement to cash assistance and caseloads begin to increase, states 
are likely to begin to look for "non-essential" services that can be 
reduced or eliminated in order to meet the cost of providing cash assis 
tance to a larger number of families. In addition, states that have 
shifted primary responsibility for the design and implementation of 
TANF programs to county governments or other local entities are 
likely to face difficult decisions about how to allocate limited resources 
to local entities with very different needs and priorities. To further 
complicate the situation, states are likely to be making these decisions 
at the same time they are required to place large numbers of their 
TANF caseloads in acceptable work activities. This complex set of cir 
cumstances is likely to result in a search for new and cheaper alterna 
tives for maintaining a focus on work.
Reassessing What Constitutes Work Participation and for Whom 
It is Required
Several key features that have distinguished current welfare-to- 
work programs from their predecessors are likely to form the basis of 
discussions about how to maintain an emphasis on work when fewer 
jobs are available and resources are more limited than they are now. 
Chief among those features are the emphasis on job search and other
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work activities, the expansion of work participation requirements to the 
majority of welfare recipients, and the emphasis on personal responsi 
bility. All of these issues are likely to be revisited if the economy 
weakens. However, given that states have approached welfare reform 
differently, the extent to which each of these issues is revisited is likely 
to vary from state to state.
PRWORA is explicit in its definition of what constitutes participa 
tion in work activities. In contrast to the former JOBS program that 
emphasized placement in long-term education and training activities, 
the allowable activities under TANF are much more directly oriented 
toward work. Activities that can count toward a state's work participa 
tion rate include: 1) unsubsidized or subsidized private or public sector 
employment; 2) on-the-job training; 3) work experience; 4) job search 
and job readiness assistance for up to six weeks; 5) community service 
programs; 6) provision of child care services to an individual partici 
pating in a community services program; and 7) vocational educational 
training (limited to 12 months for any individual and to 30 percent of 
those required to participate).
Under the JOBS program, only a small fraction of the AFDC case 
load (less than 10 percent) was mandated to participate in program 
activities, primarily because all families with children aged three and 
younger were exempt from participation. In addition, due to limited 
resources, many parents who were required to participate spent long 
periods of time on waiting lists and never actually participated in pro 
gram activities.
Under TANF, mandatory program participation has been extended 
to a substantially larger share of the TANF caseload. PRWORA gives 
states the option to exempt parents from participating in work activities 
if their youngest child is under the age of one. Only five states have 
chosen to exempt families caring for a child over the age of one year 
from their work participation requirements; 1 22 states require parents 
with children under a year to participate in program activities. In 1997, 
among the 39 states for which data is currently available, 61.5 percent 
of TANF adults were subject to the TANF participation rates (Adminis 
tration for Children and Families 1998).
Over time, as Table 2 shows, the share of the caseload required to 
participate in program activities and the intensity of participation 
increases. In FY 1997, states were required to have 25 percent of all
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families participating in work activities for a minimum of 20 hours per 
week; by FY 2002 the participation requirements increase to 50 per 
cent of the caseload participating in work activities for a minimum of 
30 hours per week. States also are required to meet significantly 
higher two-parent participation rates.
Underlying the shift to a mandatory work-based assistance is the 
belief that it is reasonable to require families to meet a set of expecta 
tions in exchange for government assistance. Given the time and 
energy local offices have invested in changing recipient and worker 
expectations, states and localities are likely to be quite reluctant to shift 
away from an emphasis on work and personal responsibility, even in an 
economic downturn when fewer jobs are available. Instead, states and 
localities will be faced with a difficult set of choices around how and 
whether to redefine what constitutes program participation, how to 
expand community work experience and subsidized work opportuni 
ties, and whether to reduce the pool of recipients required to participate 
in program activities. The experiences of states to date provide some 
indication of the magnitude of this challenge.
The strength of the economy has made it possible for many states 
to meet then" work participation requirements for all families primarily 
through a "pro rata reduction" in the participation rate to account for 
the decline in a state's caseload, unsubsidized employment, and partic 
ipation in job search. Participation in other work activities such as sub-
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sidized employment or community work experience has been less 
common.
The data presented in Table 3 illustrate the importance of the pro 
rata reduction and the extent to which states have been able to rely on 
the strength of the economy to meet the TANF work participation rates. 
Because of its significant caseload decline, Wisconsin was only 
required to have 8 percent of its TANF caseload that is subject to the 
TANF work participation requirement participating in work activities; 
with 53 percent of families participating in work activities, Wisconsin 
far exceeded the participation rate for FY 1997. The majority of fami 
lies in Wisconsin worked in unsubsidized jobs or participated in job 
search, although a sizable number also participated in work experience. 
Although California met its work participation requirement, it did so 
only by a small margin. Unlike Wisconsin, California primarily met its 
work participation targets through unsubsidized unemployment; only a 
small fraction of parents met the participation requirement by partici 
pating in job search, and an even smaller fraction met the requirement 
by participating in subsidized employment, on-the-job training, work 
experience, or community service.
Even during an economic downturn, job search programs are likely 
to remain at the core of state efforts to help welfare recipients find jobs. 
Although it is likely to take many recipients longer than the six weeks 
currently allowed under PRWORA to find employment, a substantially 
higher unemployment rate will not mean that such programs will need 
to come to a halt. Although few new jobs may be created during an 
economic downturn, normal job turnover, especially in low-wage jobs, 
will continue to produce job openings for welfare recipients to fill. In 
fact, it is easy to imagine a scenario in which welfare recipients, with 
better access to job search assistance and job developers who have cul 
tivated relationships with employers, may have an easier time finding 
employment than other low-skilled, unemployed persons who are left 
completely on their own to find employment in a slack labor market.
Even if job search remains the core of state and local welfare-to- 
work efforts, when fewer jobs are available, there is likely to be a greater 
need for alternative work-related activities such as community work 
experience or subsidized employment programs. A comparison of two 
localities in Virginia with dramatically different labor markets illustrates 
this point. In Virginia, TANF recipients with a child 18 months or older
Table 3 TANF Work Participation for All Families, Fiscal Year 1997
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SOURCE: Administration for Children and Families 1998.
a The adjusted work participation rate takes into account the "pro rata reduction" that the state received due to the decline in its TANF
caseload. 
b Recipients may be participating in more than one activity; thus, the data presented here reflects a duplicated count of participants.
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are required to look for work for 90 days and then work for pay or par 
ticipate in a Community Work Experience Program (CWEP) where they 
"work off' their grant. Recipients who work for pay can continue to 
receive their full cash assistance grant as long as their income remains 
below the poverty line, creating an unambiguous incentive for anyone 
who can work for pay to do so. A year after Lynchburg—a community 
of 66,000 people with an unemployment rate of 3.3 percent in 1995— 
implemented welfare reform, 54 percent of the parents enrolled in the 
locality's welfare-to-work program had found full-time work and 14 
percent part-time work; only 7 percent had participated in CWEP. In 
stark contrast, a year after Wise County—a rural community of 40,000 
people with an unemployment rate of 17 percent in 1995—implemented 
welfare reform, 27 percent of parents had found full-time work, 24 per 
cent had found part-time work, and 26 percent had participated in 
CWEP.
Because states have been successful at placing recipients in unsub- 
sidized jobs, only a few states have developed alternative work activi 
ties for recipients who have not found employment. Oregon, 
Massachusetts, Mississippi, Vermont, and Washington have developed 
subsidized employment programs where TANF grants are used to 
reimburse employers for recipients' wages; however, all of these pro 
grams are quite small. New York City is the only locality that operates 
a large CWEP program. Most recipients who participate in the pro 
gram work alongside city workers, cleaning parks or helping with cler 
ical tasks such as filing; some also work for nonprofit organizations. 
Because these programs have been used so little, few states or localities 
will have an infrastructure in place that will facilitate the placement of 
large numbers of recipients in alternative work activities when it 
becomes more difficult to place recipients in unsubsidized jobs.
The experience of states with subsidized employment and commu 
nity work experience programs is one of implementation difficulties, 
even on a small scale (Holcomb et al. 1998). It is often difficult to 
recruit employers to participate in subsidized employment programs, 
especially if substantial paperwork is required. Community work 
experience programs are somewhat easier to implement because recip 
ients continue to receive their TANF grant. However, CWEP place 
ments often pose a significant management challenge, especially if
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placements are limited in duration and the recipients placed in the pro 
gram face substantial barriers.
The data in Table 4 suggest that if caseloads stayed at their current 
level, many states would have to substantially increase the number of 
parents participating in work activities to meet the 50 percent work 
participation standard that will be expected in FY 2002. California, for 
example, would need to more than double its current participation rate. 
There are, however, states such as Alabama, Michigan, and Wisconsin 
that could meet the FY 2002 work participation standard with their 
current level of participation in work activities. Because the high par 
ticipation rates in these states reflect large numbers of parents who are 
working in unsubsidized employment, when fewer jobs are available 
these states may find themselves facing very similar issues as states 
that currently have lower participation rates.
Table 4 Hypothetical TANF Work Participation in Fiscal Year 2002
Additional participation
Adjusted work Participation rate needed to meet 2002 
participation standard achieved standard5 (percentage 

















































a The FY 2002 adjusted work participation standard assumes the TANF caseload 
remains at its current level. To reflect the increase in the work participation rate, this 
adjusted rate is 25 percentage points higher than the FY 1997 adjusted standard.
b The increase in participation is obtained by substracting the FY 2002 adjusted work 
participation standard from the 1997 state participation rate.
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Implementing large-scale employment programs when financial 
resources are tight and work participation rates are increasing is likely 
to pose significant challenges—and may, in fact, be impossible. Job 
search programs are low cost because services can be provided in a 
large group setting with limited individualized assistance. Because 
subsidized employment or community work experience programs 
require more attention to individual circumstances and needs, they will 
cost substantially more than the job search programs most localities are 
currently operating. A lower-cost alternative would be to require recip 
ients to participate in less-structured community activities that they 
arrange on their own. Michigan operated such a program as the first 
stage of reforming its welfare system. Recipients were required to sign 
a "social contract" in which they agreed to participate in activities that 
made a positive contribution to the communities in which they lived. 
Participating on a resident council of a public housing development, 
volunteering at Head Start or a child's school, or volunteering at one's 
church are examples of the kinds of activities that could count toward a 
recipient's social contract obligation. Recipients were required to sub 
mit a form indicating they had completed their social contract activi 
ties, but only minimal enforcement and monitoring occurred (Pavetti, 
Holcomb, and Duke 1995).
Without some type of backup program requirement such as Michi 
gan's social contract in place, states may have a difficult time empha 
sizing work, at least to the degree that it is currently emphasized. 
Localities that are currently operating alternative work programs, even 
if on a small scale, are likely to face far fewer challenges when jobs are 
much less available than those states and localities that have no knowl 
edge of what it takes to operate such programs. Nonetheless, they too 
will face significant issues operating programs that are substantially 
larger than those currently in place.
Currently, states can place 30 percent of those required to partici 
pate in work activities (i.e., 30 percent of 25 percent in FY 1997, or 7.5 
percent) in education or vocational education programs. Relaxing this 
constraint to allow more parents to participate in these activities would 
provide states with additional program alternatives for recipients who 
are unsuccessful at finding employment. Expanding the definition of 
activities to include more traditional education programs (such as adult 
basic education or GED preparation programs) would increase these
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options even further. The advantage of allowing education and training 
programs to count as allowable program activities is that these pro 
grams exist in most local communities and can often expand in a rela 
tively short time to meet excess demand.
At the federal level, and in many states, the current emphasis on 
work was hard-won, and there is likely to be substantial resistance to 
broadening the definition of work activities to include additional edu 
cational activities or increasing the fraction of recipients who can par 
ticipate in vocational training programs. States already approach 
education and training quite differently. Those that currently view edu 
cation or training as an acceptable program activity are more likely to 
support making education and training available to more of the case 
load during a recession. Illinois has recently proposed extending the 
time limit for recipients who want to further their education. In 
Nebraska, education or training is an acceptable program activity as 
long as it can be completed within the state's 24-month time limit. 
However, in Virginia, participation in an education or training program 
is only permitted if it is combined with work. In the end, the decision 
on whether such expansions are appropriate even when jobs are not 
available is likely to be influenced by fiscal realities. To the extent that 
welfare offices can rely on educational programs that already exist in 
local communities, these programs may be substantially cheaper than 
developing new alternatives.
Instead of redefining what constitutes work participation or 
expanding expensive subsidized employment or community service 
programs, it is possible that Congress and the states would opt to 
reduce the pool of recipients required to participate in work activities. 
The 22 states that require parents with children under the age of one to 
participate in program activities could decrease the pool of recipients 
required to participate in work activities without changes in federal 
law. However, changes in federal law would be required to exempt 
families with children over the age of one. Especially in states where 
the emphasis on work over education and training is especially strong, 
reducing the pool of persons required to work may be more feasible 
politically than changing the definition of what constitutes work.
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Continuing to Provide Work Incentives and Work Supports
Work incentives in the form of earned income disregards and work 
supports such as child care and transportation have been an important 
component of state efforts to reform the welfare system. They have 
provided recipients with an incentive to go to work and TANF workers 
with a tool to reward recipients in their efforts to find work. Although 
recent research shows that, when combined with other program com 
ponents such as sanctions or time limits, work incentives result in 
higher levels of employment and higher income (Miller et al. 1997; 
Bloom et al. 1998), it may be difficult to maintain these investments 
when there is more competition for a fixed set of financial resources. 
Although the fraction of the caseload that combines work and welfare 
is larger than it was prior to the expansion of earned income disregard 
policies, working recipients still account for a minority of TANF recip 
ients. Between July and September 1997, 18 percent of the total TANF 
caseload was working. The variation from state to state was substan 
tial: only 3 percent of recipients were working in Texas compared with 
47 percent in Connecticut. As suggested by Wise County's experience, 
in a slack labor market it is possible that more families will only be 
able to find part-time work, resulting in an increase in the number of 
families who combine welfare and work. If this occurs, there may be 
pressure to control the costs of offering this additional assistance to 
working families. On the other hand, working recipients could help a 
state meet their work participation rates; the cost of providing partial 
grants to more recipients might be cheaper than implementing and 
managing large-scale subsidized work or CWEP programs.
The reduction in TANF caseloads has allowed many states to shift 
financial resources from providing cash grants to families to programs 
that help families pay for child care and transportation. Under the 
JOBS program, limited funds for these supportive services often 
resulted in long waiting lists. Even when families could identify edu 
cation or training programs in the community in which they could par 
ticipate at little or no cost, limited funds for child care often made it 
impossible for them to do. We are likely to see similar situations 
occurring if caseloads begin to increase, although it will occur in a 
more complex environment. Some states have used a portion of their 
TANF funds and their additional child care dollars to eliminate waiting
240 Pavetti
lists for child care for working poor families. If more families begin to 
receive cash assistance and are required to participate in program activ 
ities almost full-time, child care resources will undoubtedly be 
stretched. Because child care is no longer an entitlement for cash 
assistance participants, families receiving cash assistance and working 
poor families will are likely to find themselves in direct competition for 
the same child care dollars.
Reassessing Time Limits
Although it is impossible to predict when we might begin to see a 
downturn in the economy, it is likely to occur around the same time 
that time limits begin to kick in and high work participation rates are in 
effect. Although there is reason to be concerned about what will hap 
pen when time limits hit, many states have implemented extension pol 
icies that will provide them with procedures to address the situations of 
recipients who have looked for work but have been unable to find it. 
Virginia, for example, provides unlimited extensions to families who 
hit the time limit in areas with high unemployment rates. Some states 
with extension policies in place have already made widespread use of 
those extensions for families who have played by the rules (Bloom et 
al. 1998), which may set the tone for other states to do so as well.
If the economy weakens and remains weak for an extended period 
of time, there may be a need to examine the possibility of allowing for 
extensions to the federal time limit and/or increasing the fraction of the 
caseload who can be exempted from the time limit. Currently, 
PRWORA allows states to exempt 20 percent of their caseload from 
the 60-month lifetime time limit, meaning that 20 percent of a state's 
caseload can receive benefits for more than 60 months. It is up to 
states to decide who will be exempted from the time limit. Although 
PRWORA does not make a distinction between extensions and exemp 
tions, states do make this distinction. Parents exempted from the time 
limit are parents who are not expected to meet the state's work require 
ments. Common exemptions include advanced age and a parent who 
is disabled or caring for a disabled child. Extensions to the time limit 
are generally granted to parents who are expected to work but have 
been unable to find work. Even if the 20 percent exemption ends up 
being sufficient to cover the number of families who are not expected
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to work, it is unlikely to be sufficient to cover the additional needs of 
families who can work but can't find jobs.
Due to the extremely strong emphasis on work and personal 
responsibility, it is possible that gaining political consensus to extend 
time limits may be less difficult than gaining consensus to expand the 
definition of what constitutes participation in work activities. In most 
states, time limits have been implemented in conjunction with full fam 
ily sanctions. This means that if policies are implemented as they are 
intended, the only families that will be affected by time limits are fam 
ilies that have played by the rules and have been unable to make it on 
their own. Families that do not play by the rules will have lost their 
benefits due to sanctions long before time limits hit. While there may 
be some opposition to extending time limits when jobs are not avail 
able (and especially when resources are limited), time limits may be 
less of an issue during an economic downturn than we might initially 
anticipate, especially if states are able to continue to mandate participa 
tion in work activities for families who have exhausted their time limit.
It is too early to have learned very much about how time limits 
have affected the behavior of recipients. However, early implementa 
tion analyses suggest that time limits have created a sense of urgency 
in local welfare offices and local communities that did not exist prior to 
welfare reform (Bloom and Butler 1995; Holcomb et al. 1998). One 
dilemma decision makers will face when jobs are not available is how 
to extend time limits for families who are unable to find employment 
while maintaining the sense of urgency that time limits have created. 
That sense of urgency has brought many communities together to iden 
tify opportunities for collaboration and to create common program 
goals, building on each organization's strengths to provide welfare 
recipients with the resources they need to succeed on their own. If 
time limits are relaxed and the sense of urgency is reduced, it is unclear 
whether community-based reform efforts will have garnered sufficient 
momentum to continue. It is interesting to note that in Wise County, 
Virginia, where recipients who exhaust their time limit will be eligible 
for benefits for an extended period of time because of the high unem 
ployment rate, the community has banded together to bring jobs to the 
area and to create opportunities for recipients to work in CWEP posi 
tions that might lead to future employment. The sense of urgency that
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exists in the county mirrors that found in other counties with signifi 
cantly lower unemployment rates.
Maintaining a Focus on Job Retention, Job Advancement, and 
Strategies for the Hard-to-Employ
Concerns about long-term welfare dependency provided the cata 
lyst to dramatically alter the purpose and structure of providing cash 
assistance as an entitlement. In spite of this focus on reducing long- 
term welfare dependency, most state and local efforts have emphasized 
reductions in caseload, not distinguishing which types of welfare recip 
ients were leaving the welfare rolls. To increase work among welfare 
recipients, most states have focused on strategies that have worked for 
recipients with moderate, but not more severe, barriers to employment. 
Many of these recipients probably would have had relatively short 
stays on welfare without any assistance or prodding. Those in the 
midst of long stays on welfare are most likely to still be on the welfare 
rolls today.
Now that caseloads have declined and states have more financial 
resources per recipient available, many states have turned their atten 
tion to strategies to help the hardest-to-employ, many of whom are 
long-term welfare recipients. Some states are working on integrating 
substance abuse treatment into their welfare-to-work programs by co- 
locating substance abuse professionals on site; others are trying to 
identify recipients with learning disabilities and provide accommoda 
tions such as specialized testing or job coaches for them; others are 
developing supported work programs, building on programs developed 
for persons with developmental disabilities or chronic mental health 
problems. Except in a few isolated programs, these strategies were not 
part of earlier welfare-to-work efforts.
Prior to the current round of reform, many hard-to-employ recipi 
ents were exempt from participating in welfare-to-work activities; oth 
ers who were not exempt languished in a holding status because TANF 
workers had neither the time nor the resources to work with them. The 
current resource-rich environment provides states and localities with 
an unprecedented opportunity to identify promising strategies for 
working with this group of families. A downturn in the economy has 
the potential to stall or significantly reduce these efforts. We know lit-
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tie about what strategies might work best for this group of families; in 
times of competition for scarce resources, states will be far less likely 
to invest in strategies that do not have a proven track record than they 
are in the current environment.
Similarly, the decline in caseloads has allowed states to begin to 
think about longer-term strategies for helping welfare recipients stay 
employed longer and move into better paying jobs. If resources 
become strained, these efforts are likely to be perceived as luxuries 
rather than necessities. Thus, like efforts to find promising strategies 
for the hard-to-employ, these efforts are likely to be halted if the econ 
omy weakens.
FACTORS AFFECTING THE MAGNITUDE OF THE POLICY 
AND IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES
Many factors will undoubtedly affect how policymakers and pro 
gram administrators respond to a change in the economy. Two factors 
stand out as especially important: the extent to which caseloads 
increase when the unemployment rate begins to climb and the extent to 
which states and localities have created a stable infrastructure to sup 
port their current reform efforts.
How Much and How Fast Caseloads Increase
The magnitude of the problems states will face in maintaining a 
focus on work will largely depend on how much and how fast case 
loads rise. The more caseloads rise, the fewer resources states will 
have for providing alternative work or training activities for families 
unable to find employment in the paid labor market, for providing 
earned income disregards and work supports, and for maintaining their 
current efforts to promote job retention and identify strategies for the 
hardest-to-employ. Although research based on historical data sug 
gests that caseloads will rise substantially when the unemployment rate 
rises, there are several reasons why these models may overestimate 
caseload increases in the current policy environment.
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First, if a substantial fraction of recipients have left welfare for 
work and the economy continues to stay strong for awhile, we should 
expect some families who lose their jobs during an economic downturn 
to qualify for unemployment insurance. Only after an extended period 
of unemployment should these families need to turn to the welfare sys 
tem for support. While it is too early to tell how many families may 
fall into this category, as more employment data becomes available for 
recipients who have left the welfare rolls, it should be possible to esti 
mate the fraction of recipients who appear to meet the eligibility crite 
ria for unemployment insurance and will not immediately need to turn 
to the welfare system for support. However, in a recession, many 
workers exhaust their unemployment insurance benefits. This will be 
more of a problem if the recession is deep and long.
Second, assuming states continue to mandate participation in 
employment-related activities and impose full family sanctions, fami 
lies who are unwilling or unable to comply with these requirements 
will continue to be ineligible for benefits. Although there is no 
research that examines how much full family sanctions or noncompli- 
ance with applicant job search requirements have contributed to the 
decline in the AFDC/TANF caseload, the large number of families 
sanctioned would suggest they have played a nontrivial role. If work 
requirements become less stringent or are expanded to allow broader 
participation in education and training activities, it is possible that 
some families who previously failed to comply with work require 
ments may return to the welfare rolls. In addition, if sanctioned fami 
lies are now relying on family and friends who fall on hard times, they 
are likely to return to the welfare system if no other alternatives are 
available to them.
Third, with a more stringent work mandate in place, more recipi 
ents may find work in an economic downturn than would have prior to 
the implementation of such mandates. That is not to say that recipients 
will not find it very difficult to find employment. However, if recipi 
ents are required to look for work even in times of high unemployment, 
the speed with which and rate at which families leave welfare for work 
should be higher than they would have been during earlier years with 
similarly high unemployment rates when such mandates were not in 
place. Again, Wise County is a case in point. Although Wise County's 
caseload has not declined as fast as the state as a whole (40.2 percent),
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between June 1995 and April 1998 the county's caseload declined by 
18.5 percent.
The Stability of the New Welfare Infrastructure
States and localities are all at different stages of shifting to a work- 
based assistance system. While some states started to implement 
major reforms only recently, others implemented major reforms long 
before welfare reform passed at the federal level. States and localities 
that have a longer history of implementation will not be immune to the 
policy and implementation issues that all states and localities will face 
during an economic downturn. However, they are likely to be in a bet 
ter position to develop alternative program strategies and to redeploy 
staff resources. Organizations that are still in flux and have not yet 
developed a new, stable infrastructure to accommodate a focus on work 
will face an especially difficult time in responding to a downturn in the 
economy. Change takes time and is difficult for most staff, even when 
they believe the changes are positive. Implementing new changes 
before the first changes take hold could prove to be a disaster for local 
offices that are still trying to create an environment that promotes and 
supports work.
If TANF caseloads increase, food stamp and Medicaid caseloads 
will undoubtedly increase as well. While states have dealt with 
increases in these programs in the past, the environment in which these 
programs are currently operating has changed to accommodate the 
implementation of a work-based assistance system for families with 
children. To provide TANF program workers with reduced caseloads 
that make it feasible for them to focus on work-related and eligibility 
activities, many offices have increased the caseloads of workers who 
work with food stamp and Medicaid recipients not receiving TANF 
benefits, making it far more difficult for the latter workers to increase 
their caseloads any further.
Although states with lower caseload declines are likely to have a 
more difficult time meeting work participation rates in the short term, 
their current experiences may put them in a better position to adjust to 
a downturn in the economy. The strategies they are implementing are 
less likely to rely on the availability of the "extra" resources that states 
with very large caseload declines have available. In addition, they are
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more likely to have (or be putting into place) strategies that will help 
them to meet the work participation rates, without the advantage of an 
extremely large caseload reduction credit. For example, Kentucky and 
New York primarily have met their work participation requirements 
through actual participation rather than caseload reduction credits. 
New York operates a large community work experience program; Ken 
tucky makes extensive use of vocational education and work experi 
ence in addition to unsubsidized employment.
CONCLUSION
A downturn in the economy is inevitable; at some point, policy- 
makers at the federal, state, and local levels will be faced with deci 
sions about how to sustain a work-based assistance system when jobs 
are less readily available. While it seems unlikely that policymakers or 
program operators would shift away from a focus on work, it may be 
necessary to broaden the definition of what constitutes participation in 
a work activity. Such a definition might include more liberal use of 
vocational education or training programs and might also include 
active participation in community activities such as volunteering in a 
child's school. The other alternative will be to develop more alterna 
tive program activities such as community work experience or public 
service employment programs, but these programs often are costly to 
operate. With a fixed level of funding, states and localities will be 
faced with difficult choices about how to balance competing interests 
and program goals. Although it is impossible to fully prepare for an 
economic downturn, the choices states and localities make now will 
significantly affect the issues they will face when jobs are not as 
readily available as they are now. Given the range of choices available 
to them about how to spend their TANF and Welfare-to-work dollars, it 
is probably in every state's interest to begin, even if on a small scale, 
the development of a community service, work experience, and/or sub 
sidized employment program now while the economy is still strong. 
Developing the infrastructure for such a program in a resource-rich 
environment is likely to be far less daunting than it will be when 
resources are tight and employment opportunities are limited. States
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and localities have made significant progress in shifting to work-based 
assistance; nonetheless, welfare reform remains a work in progress. 
The ability to weather an economic downturn will be an important test 
of whether it is possible—and what it takes—to sustain an employ 
ment-focused assistance over the long term.
Note
1. Although states can choose to exempt families with a child over the age of one 
from participating in work activities, these families are included in the state's base 
of families who are subject to a work requirement for purposes of calculating a 
state's work participation rate.
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